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Abstract 
The present paper focuses on what psychological processes are driving people’s reactions to 
fair and unfair events. Specifically, by extending on ideas that people's reactions to fair and 
unfair events consist at least partly of affect-related responses, and by adopting the 
assumption made in cognitive-experiential self-theory that the operation of experiential 
mindsets is intimately associated with affect-related experiences, we formulate the hypothesis 
that individual differences in affect intensity will moderate reactions to fair and unfair events. 
Introducing a novel manipulation of experiential and rationalistic mindsets to the research 
literature, the findings of two studies indeed reveal that especially for people in experiential 
(vs. rationalistic) mindsets negative affective reactions to fair and unfair events increase with 
high (vs. low) scores on affect intensity. Implications for the literature on social justice, 
experiential mindsets, and affect intensity are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: fairness, justice, experiential and rationalistic mindsets, affect intensity, dual 
processes 
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An Affective-Experiential Perspective on Reactions to Fair and Unfair Events: 
Individual Differences in Affect Intensity Moderated by Experiential Mindsets 
Perceived fairness strongly influences people’s behaviors, attitudes, and feelings in 
organizations, courtrooms, universities, friendships, and romantic relationships (see, e.g., 
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). It has been shown for 
example, that experiencing fair outcome allocations (distributive fairness) or fair treatment 
(procedural fairness) during the allocation of outcomes leads people to experience more 
positive emotional feelings and that experiencing unfair outcome allocations and unfair 
procedures leads people to feel more angry and sad about the events that happened to them 
(e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Despite the attention 
fairness reactions receive in the literature, there is still relatively little known about what 
psychological processes exactly drive people’s reactions to fairness judgments (Lind, 2002; 
Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).  
In the literature on justice and morality, two main mechanisms are proposed that could 
underlie reactions to fair and unfair events (Beauchamp, 2001). Social intuitionist notions 
propose that people react to fairness-related events based on their intuitions and gut feelings 
(Haidt, 2001, 2003; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). In contrast, rationalistic models (e.g., 
Pizarro & Bloom, 2003) argue that fairness reactions are actually shaped and formed by 
deliberative or rationalistic reasoning processes, and that people’s affective reactions to a 
situation largely depend on the cognitive appraisal of the situation and the surrounding 
context (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). 
More generally, many dual process theories recognize that both affective-experiential and 
cognitive-rational processes underlie people’s reactions, and suggest that which mechanism 
gets the upper hand depends from situation to situation and person to person (e.g., Chaiken & 
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Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1985, 1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
In the current paper we aim to investigate how such situational and individual factors 
may impinge on people’s reactions to fair and unfair events. More specifically, we will put 
forward an affective-experiential perspective on how people react to fair and unfair events. In 
developing this perspective, we integrate insights from different conceptual frameworks and 
corresponding lines of research, namely cognitive-experiential self-theory (e.g., Epstein, 
1985, 1994) and work on individual differences in affect intensity (Larsen, Diener, & 
Emmons, 1986; Van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003). 
Affective-Experiential Fairness Reactions 
In correspondence with different lines of research that argue that people can process 
information either more intuitively or more rationally (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 
Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992, Lerner & Goldberg, 1999; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein, 1985, 
1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999) distinguishes between two conceptual systems that people use 
to process information, namely experiential-intuitive and rationalistic-cognitive systems. The 
experiential way of processing information is intuitive, preconsciously encodes information 
into concrete images or metaphors, and makes associative connections. In experiential modes, 
events are experienced passively, and people can be seized by their emotions. The rationalistic 
way of processing information, on the other hand, is analytic, encodes information in abstract 
ways, is based on making logical cause and effect connections, and requires intentional and 
effortful information processes. In rationalistic modes, people experience events consciously 
and actively while thinking things over and making justifications for what happens.  
Research on work on individual differences in affect intensity has shown that people 
differ consistently in the intensity of their affective responses to the same event (Larsen, 
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Diener, & Cropanzano, 1987; Larsen et al., 1986). That is, some consistently may experience 
mild emotional responses whereas others may experience strong emotional responses when 
exposed to the same affect-related events. These findings are relevant to justice research as it 
has been shown that people’s reactions to similar fair and unfair events may differ due to 
individual differences in affect intensity (Van den Bos et al. 2003). More precisely, Van den 
Bos et al. (2003) found that for those high in affect intensity affective reactions were more 
negative following either unfair outcome distributions or procedures as opposed to fair 
outcome distributions or procedures. For people low in affect intensity such effects were not 
found. These results suggest that individual differences play a profound role in explaining 
people’s fairness reactions and may imply that fairness reactions are to a great extent based on 
affective processes. 
The Current Research 
Based on the literature outlined above, there have been speculations in the justice 
literature on the importance of experiential and rationalistic mindsets (e.g., Lerner & 
Goldberg, 1999), yet no strong empirical tests of the influence of these mindsets on people’s 
fairness reactions. To examine the influence of these mindsets, we will bring people in either 
experiential or rationalistic mindsets. To this end, we developed a manipulation that varies the 
mindsets (experiential or rationalistic) people are in, such that people react more based on 
their gut feelings when in experiential mindsets and more deliberately when in rationalistic 
mindsets. According to our knowledge, the effects of such a manipulation have not been 
studied before in the cognitive-experiential literature nor in the justice domain and here we 
use this novel manipulation to examine whether people’s mindsets may indeed influence their 
fairness reactions. 
Furthermore, we explicitly note here that cognitive-experiential self-theory assumes 
that the operation of experiential mindsets is intimately associated with affect-related 
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experiences (see, e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999). In the current paper, we follow up this 
assumption by explicitly proposing that evidence for this supposition should be found when 
differences in the strength with which people tend to experience affect-related events would 
influence people's fairness reactions when they process information in experiential ways. In 
other words, we expect that when people have been brought into experiential mindsets, 
individual differences in affect intensity (Larsen et al., 1986, 1987) will moderate their 
reactions to fair and unfair events. In contrast, rationalistic mindsets by definition rely more 
on cold-cognitive information processing (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Van den Bos, 2007) 
and hence we expect that when people have been brought in rationalistic mindsets they should 
show less, perhaps even nonsignificant, moderating effects of individual differences in affect 
intensity on their fairness reactions.  
In order to test our predictions we measured in both experiments reported here, 
participants’ level of affect intensity (Larsen et al., 1986) at the start of our experiments. Then 
we induced either experiential or rationalistic mindsets. This was followed by manipulating 
the outcomes (Experiment 1) or the procedures (Experiment 2) participants received, after 
which we measured participants’ negative affective reactions to fair versus unfair outcome 
allocations in Experiment 1 as well as to fair versus unfair procedures in Experiment 2.1  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and seventy-seven students (96 women and 81 
men) at Utrecht University participated in the experiment, and were paid 4 Euros for their 
participation. Participants first filled out the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM, Larsen et al., 
1986). Then, they were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (mindset: 
experiential vs. rationalistic) × 2 (outcome: unequal payment vs. equal payment) design.  
Experimental procedure. Participants were invited to the laboratory to participate in a 
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study on human judgment. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to separate 
cubicles, each of which contained a computer, screen, and keyboard. All instructions were 
presented on the computer screens. The computers were used to present the stimulus 
information and to collect data on the dependent variables and manipulation checks. 
Participants were informed that they would participate in three separate studies and 
that they would be clearly told when one study had ended and the next one would begin. The 
first study consisted of filling out the AIM. Example items are: “Sad movies deeply touch 
me”, “I can remain calm even in the most trying days” (recoded), “When I’m happy I bubble 
over with energy”, and “I get overly enthusiastic”. All ratings were made on 7-point scales (1 
= never, 7 = always; α = .84). After a 1 minute break, the second study began in which either 
experiential or rationalistic mindsets were manipulated.  
Participants in the experiential condition read: “Various research studies have shown 
that people process information they read differently. Important and often used methods are 
having many associative thoughts while reading, connecting the contents to one’s own 
experiences, and visualizing what is described while reading. Based on intuition, gut feelings, 
own experiences, and associations evoked by the information read, people form their opinions 
about the information. Terms used to express their opinions are expressive and impulsive in 
nature; people say what they think and what is on their hearts.”  
Subsequently, participants were asked to think for 45 seconds about how they thought 
they would read, process, and react to information, when in such a state of mind, and asked to 
type in what they had just thought of. Next, participants were informed that they were about 
to read a text on which they could react by answering some open-ended questions. 
Participants read: “We would like to ask you to read the text and answer the questions in the 
way just described to you. You could do this by reading the text and reacting to it as 
expressively and impulsively as possible, and by basing your opinion on your gut feelings and 
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intuition. You can write down anything you want while expressing your point of view. The 
first thing that comes to mind is often what you are thinking and that is what we would like to 
know. There are no right or wrong answers and reactions. Thus, everything that you type in 
will be the right thing, as long as it is your own, first reaction to what you are reading. 
Naturally, everything you type in will be treated confidentially and anonymously.”  
This was followed by a summary of the main points of participants’ instructions: “(1) 
React to the text and questions by typing in the first thing that comes to mind; (2) be as 
expressive as possible in your reactions; (3) be as intuitive as possible in your reactions; listen 
to your gut feelings; (4) there are no right or wrong answers, as every first reaction that is 
yours is right and you can type in anything you want”.  
Participants subsequently read and responded to text materials (derived from Haidt, 
2001), of which pilot testing had shown that participants at Utrecht University could react to it 
spontaneously in either experiential or rationalistic ways. Participants read: “Vera and Mark 
are brother and sister. They are traveling together around Thailand on summer vacation. One 
night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. Jointly they decide that it would be 
interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience 
for each of them. Vera was already taking birth control pills for some time, but Mark uses a 
condom too, just to be safe. They both equally enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it 
again. They keep that night to themselves as a special secret, which makes them feel even 
closer to each other than already was the case.”  
Participants were asked to answer the following open-ended questions by typing in 
their responses: (1) “What do you think of this situation? Was it a proper decision of Vera and 
Mark to make love?” and (2) “What do you think of Vera and Mark?” In this way, 
participants could actually carry out the mindset they found themselves in by reacting to a 
story that could be interpreted either based on gut feelings or by weighing pros and cons.  
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To induce rationalistic mindsets, a similar procedure was used. That is, in the 
rationalistic condition participants read: “Various research studies have shown that people 
process information they read differently. Important and often used methods are reading and 
scanning the text carefully, and analyzing it by weighing the pros en cons in a logical way. 
Based on facts and precise processing of the information read, people form their opinions 
about the information. Terms used to express opinions in this way are for example “On the 
one hand … and on the other hand.” 
Subsequently, participants were asked to think about how they would read, process, 
and react to information when in such a state of mind, and to type in what they had just 
thought of. Hereafter, they were informed that they were about to read a text on which they 
could react by answering some open-ended questions. Participants read: “We would like to 
ask you to read the text and answer the questions in the way just described to you. You could 
do this by reading the text and reacting to it by pondering upon the text, weigh it, and be as 
analytical as possible. Try to weigh the pros and cons, and to think as rationalistic as possible 
about the contents of the text, before forming an opinion and giving your reaction. There are 
no right or wrong answers and reactions. Thus, everything that you type in will be the right 
thing, as long as it is your own, rationalistic and carefully-constructed reaction to what you 
were reading. Naturally, everything you type in will be treated confidentially and 
anonymously.” 
Hereafter, the main points were summarized: “(1) Take your time to ponder on the text 
and your reactions to the questions; (2) try to weigh the pros and cons: Think things over from 
all angles; (3) type in your reaction once you have thought it over as rationalistic and 
analytically as possible; (4) there are no right or wrong answers: Every reaction that is yours 
and well thought-through is right”. Then, the same text derived from Haidt (2001) and open-
ended questions with regard to that text were given as in the experiential condition.  
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Directly hereafter, participants were informed that the second study had ended and the 
third study would begin. In this study outcome was manipulated. All participants were asked 
to imagine the following situation: “In addition to your studies you work for a couple of hours 
per week. Both the work and your colleagues are nice. Since there is plenty of work, you are 
all expected to work hard. Therefore, all of you give 100 percent and after a days work you 
get home tired. Everybody works equally hard and does the same kind and amount of work. 
You do not mind working hard since you like the job and get paid reasonably well. But then 
life seems to be getting more expensive. Your rent increases, as well as your tuition fees. 
Textbooks are getting more expensive, doing groceries cost you more and more, clothing is 
expensive too, and your social life demands increasingly more money. You start wondering 
how to pull it off which makes you feel uncertain. You also start wondering whether you 
should start working longer hours and if you do so, what has to become of your studies.” 
In the equal payment condition, participants subsequently read: “Then you happen to 
find out that none of your colleagues, who are in everything comparable to you, earn more 
than you do. You also find out that your boss decided to give all of you the same raise. Thus, 
the salary stays the same for all of you.” In the unequal payment condition, participants read: 
“Then you happen to find out that your colleagues, who are in everything comparable to you, 
earn more than you do. You also find out that your boss decided to give your colleagues a 
raise. You on the contrary, will not receive anything like that and you are not told why.” 
This was followed by questions measuring the dependent variables and the 
manipulation checks. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. The main dependent variables 
were participants’ negative affective reactions with regard to the outcome they received. 
Specifically, participants were asked to what extent they felt sad, disappointed and angry with 
their outcome (1 = not at all, 7 = completely; α = .83).  
The manipulation of mindset was checked in two ways. First, participants were asked 
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to rate at the end of the experiment whether they, while reading the text about Vera and Mark, 
thought things through thoroughly before reacting (1 = certainly not, 7 = certainly); weighed 
and pondered upon their answers before reacting (1 = certainly not, 7 = certainly); reacted 
intuitively to the questions (1 = certainly not, 7 = certainly); reacted impulsively to the 
questions by typing in the first that came to their minds (1 = certainly not, 7 = certainly); and 
whether they answered the questions more rationalistically and analytically, or more 
impulsively and intuitively (1 = very analytical and rationalistic, 7 = very intuitive and 
impulsive). After the first two questions were recoded, all five items were averaged to form a 
reliable index to check on the manipulation of mindset (α = .85).  
Second, participants’ answers to the two open-ended questions were rated by two 
coders, who were blind to the conditions and the aim of the experiment. The coders were 
asked to read all the answers participants had given to the two open-ended questions and to 
rate on 7-point scales how experiential and how rationalistic the given answers were to their 
opinion. This was done as follows: 
For the answers participants gave to the first open-ended question about the situation 
Vera and Mark found themselves in, coders answered five questions that rated the experiential 
quality of participants’ answers, namely: “The answer to this question is given impulsively or 
intuitively (1 = certainly not impulsive or intuitive, 7 = very impulsive or intuitive); it seems 
that the first that came to mind is answered (1 = certainly do not agree, 7 = certainly do 
agree); the answer is given expressively (1 = very inexpressive, 7 = very expressive); the 
answer is more based on feelings than on rationalistic considerations (1 = certainly do not 
agree, 7 = certainly do agree); the answer is given more on a first impulse than deliberately (1 
= certainly do not agree, 7 = certainly do agree)”. The ratings were averaged per coder to 
form reliable scales to check for experiential mindset (αCoder 1 = .97; αCoder 2 = .97) and 
because these scales correlated highly (r = .75, p < .001), we collapsed them to form one scale 
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to check for experiential mindsets (α = .97). The same procedure was followed for the 
answers participants had given to the second open-ended question about what they thought of 
Vera and Mark (αCoder 1 = .92; αCoder 2 = .95; r = .66, p < .001; α = .94).  
To measure the rationalistic quality of participants’ given answers to the first open-
ended question, coders also rated five items, namely: “The answer to this question is given 
well-considerately (1 = certainly not well-considerate, 7 = very well-considerate); the 
question was well thought through before the answer was given (1 = certainly not well 
thought through, 7 = very well thought through); the question is answered rationalistic and 
analytically (1 = not rationalistic at all, 7 = very rationalistic); you can tell from the answer 
that the person weighed pros and cons while answering the question (1 = certainly do not 
agree, 7 = certainly do agree); pros and cons are given in the answer, or different points of 
view are taken and given (1 = pros and cons are certainly not given, 7 = pros and cons are 
certainly given).” These were averaged per coder to form reliable scales to check for 
rationalistic mindset (α coder 1 = .98; α coder 2 = .98) and since the scales correlated highly 
(r = .77, p < .001), the scales were collapsed to form one scale to check for rationalistic 
mindset (α = .97). The same procedure was followed for the answers participants had given to 
the second open-ended question (αCoder 1 = .95; αCoder 2 = .97; r = .73, p < .001; α = .96).  
As a check on the manipulation of outcome, participants were asked to rate themselves 
how fair (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair), just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), right (1 = not 
right at all, 7 = very right), and justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) they 
considered the outcome they received. These items were averaged to form a reliable scale to 
check on the manipulation of outcome (α = .97). Finally, participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid for their participation. 
Results 
In all analyses, we regressed the manipulation checks and dependent variables on 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Affective-Experiential Mindsets and Fairness Reactions   13 
AIM, mindset, and outcome, testing for all main effects and all interactions. Following 
Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), we centered the continuous AIM variable and effect-
coded the independent variables mindset and outcome.  
Manipulation checks. First, participants rated their reactions, on a scale ranging from 
rationalistic reactions to experiential reactions, as more experiential in the experiential 
mindset condition (M = 5.18, SD = 0.98) than in the rationalistic mindset condition (M = 3.31, 
SD = 1.04), β = -.69, t(169) = -12.41, p < .001. Since this effect was neither qualified by an 
interaction of mindset with either AIM or the procedure manipulation, nor by the three-way 
interaction, this indicates that the mindset manipulation was induced as intended.2 
Second, regression analyses on the ratings of the coders’ experiential and rationalistic 
mindset scales also only yielded significant main effects of mindset. More specifically, the 
coders rated participants’ answers to the first open-ended question about what they thought of 
Vera and Mark’s situation as more experiential for participants in experiential mindset 
conditions than for participants in rationalistic mindset conditions (β = -.47, t(169) = -7.07, p 
< .001; MExperiential = 6.06, SD = 0.84; MRationalistic = 4.64, SD = 1.69). The same effect was 
found for the second open-ended question about what participants thought of Vera and Mark 
(β = -.42, t(169) = -6.01, p < .001; MExperiential = 6.04, SD = 0.78; MRationalistic = 5.00, SD = 
1.40). Further, the coders rated participants’ answers to the first open-ended question as more 
rationalistic for participants in rationalistic mindset conditions than for participants in 
experiential mindset conditions (β = .44, t(169) = 6.41, p < .001; MRationalistic = 2.57, SD = 
1.66; MExperiential = 1.36, SD = 0.62). The same effect was found for the second open ended 
question (β = .36, t(169) = 5.04, p < .001; MRationalistic = 2.09, SD = 1.34; MExperiential = 1.31, SD 
= 0.53). Therefore, we can conclude that the mindset manipulation was induced successfully.3  
Finally, participants indicated to experience the equal outcome condition to be more 
fair (M = 5.59, SD = 1.66) than the unequal outcome condition (M = 1.75, SD = 1.02), β = .81, 
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t(169) = 18.33, p < .001. Since no other main and interactions effects were found, this implies 
that the outcome manipulation was induced as intended.  
Negative outcome affect. Regressing the negative affect scale yielded a significant 
main effect of outcome, β = -.65, t(169) = -11.47, p < .001, and a significant two-way 
interaction between mindset and outcome, β = .12, t(169) = 2.10, p = .04. More importantly, 
these effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, β = .12, t(169) = 2.09, p = 
04. To get better insight into these effects, we subsequently conducted regression analyses 
with AIM and outcome as predictors in both the experiential and rationalistic mindset 
conditions. In the experiential condition this yielded a significant main effect of outcome, β = 
-.73, t(83) = -10.08, p < .001, indicating that participants reacted with more negative affect 
following the unequal payment condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.27) compared to the equal 
payment condition (M = 2.27, SD = 1.25). Moreover, as expected, we found the significant 
two-way interaction between AIM and outcome, β = -.20, t(83) = -2.85, p < .01, indicating 
that in the experiential condition, participants’ fairness reactions were moderated by affect 
intensity, such that negative affective reactions increased with AIM in the unequal payment 
condition, β = .29, t(43) = 1.99, p = .05, but decreased with AIM in the equal payment 
condition, β = -.31, t(40) = -2.03, p < .05. Figure 1 depicts the visual representation of the 
regression model at one SD below and one SD above the mean on AIM  (see Cohen et. al, 
2003) and the left part of this figure shows the reported effects. In the rationalistic mindset 
condition, we only found a significant main effect of outcome, β = -.56, t(86) = -6.37, p < 
.001, indicating that participants’ affective reactions were more negative in the unequal (M = 
4.21, SD = 1.39) compared to the equal payment condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.34), irrespective 
of affect intensity. The right part of Figure 1 shows this effect.  
Discussion 
We proposed that if experiential mindsets influence people’s fairness judgments 
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through affect, then this influence will be moderated by individual differences in affect 
intensity. The effects of Experiment 1 do indeed reveal that experiential mindsets cause 
fairness reactions to be influenced by individual differences in the strength with which people 
are inclined to react to affect-related events. In further correspondence with our predictions, 
these individual differences in affect intensity had no statistically significant effects on 
participants’ fairness reactions when they had adopted a rationalistic mindset. That is, these 
participants only showed more negative reactions to unfair as compared to fair outcome 
allocations, irrespective of affect intensity. 
For now we can conclude that the effects reveal that experiential mindsets may make 
people’s fairness reactions more susceptible to affect-related processes, especially when 
negative affective reactions to fairness experiences are assessed. But before drawing strong 
conclusions, it was important to carry out a refined replication. Because we introduced a 
novel manipulation of experiential and rationalistic mindsets to test our ideas, the main aim of 
Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings that experiential mindsets cause fairness reactions 
to be strongly influenced by individual differences in affect intensity. Furthermore, because 
negative affect is a fairly general measure existing of different kinds of feelings, in 
Experiment 2 we took the differentiated nature of negative affective fairness reactions (see, 
e.g., Mikula et al., 1998; Krehbiel, & Cropanzano, 2000; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, 
Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005; Weiss et al., 1999), better into account by measuring multi-
item measures of both anger and sadness pertaining to the fairness events experienced in 
Experiment 2.  
Of course there is more to fairness research than the fairness of outcome distributions. 
A major orientation of the fairness literature is on how people react to the perceived fairness 
of decision-making processes (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988), and a very well-known finding in 
the literature is that people evaluate procedures that allow them an opportunity to voice their 
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opinions in a decision-making process to be more fair than procedures that explicitly deny 
them such an opportunity (e.g., Folger, 1977). Therefore, in Experiment 2, we used a different 
fairness manipulation and varied the procedure by explicitly giving participants either voice 
or no voice, thereby exactly following often used methods of manipulating voice procedures 
(see, e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1997).  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we again measured individual differences in affect intensity and we 
conducted the same mindset manipulation as in Experiment 1. The procedure manipulation 
consisted of varying whether participants either were or were not explicitly given the 
opportunity to voice what they thought would be a good duration and degree of difficulty of a 
task they had to do as part of the experiment, by either giving or withholding them the 
opportunity to communicate their point of view by typing it in. Main dependent variables 
were procedural anger and sadness. To further examine the robustness of the effects reported 
here, in Experiment 2 there was, in contrast to Experiment 1, no uncertainty in our stimulus 
materials, in order to be able to examine whether the effects of our affective-experiential 
perspective also can be found in situations in which uncertainty is not accentuated. 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and eighteen (97 women and 21 men) Utrecht 
University students participated in the experiment, and received either 4 Euros or course 
credits for their participation. Participants first filled out the AIM, after which they were 
randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (mindset: experiential vs. rationalistic) × 2 
(procedure: voice vs. no voice) design. 
Experimental procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were, on arrival in the 
laboratory, led to separate cubicles containing a computer that was used to present the 
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stimulus information and to collect data on the dependent variables and manipulation checks. 
In further correspondence with Experiment 1, participants were informed that the experiment 
consisted of three separate studies and that they would be clearly informed when one study 
had ended and the next study would begin. Additionally, participants were informed that it 
was possible to communicate via the computer network and that they had to do a computer 
task at the end of the experiment of which the duration and degree of difficulty still had to be 
decided upon. The first study consisted of filling out the AIM (α = .86). In the second study 
either experiential or rationalistic mindsets were induced in exactly the same way as in 
Experiment 1. Then, the third study began in which procedure was manipulated. 
For this, participants received a message via the computer network from the 
experimenter. It was again outlined to participants that at the end they had to do a computer 
task of which the duration still had to be decided upon. In the voice condition, participants 
subsequently read that the experimenter was very interested in participants’ opinion and 
therefore would be given the opportunity to type in how long they thought the computer task 
should last. They learned that the decision of the duration and degree of difficulty would be 
made based on their answers. Then, they were asked to think that over for 45 seconds, after 
which they were actually given the opportunity to express their opinion by typing in the 
minutes and seconds they thought were suitable for the last computer task. In the no-voice 
condition, participants read that the experimenter was not interested in their opinion and 
therefore would not be given the opportunity to type in how long they thought the computer 
task should last. Thus, the decision of the duration and degree of difficulty would not be made 
based on their answers. Then, they were asked to think that over for 45 seconds, after which 
they were actually not given the opportunity to express their opinion. 
This was followed by questions encompassing the dependent variables and the 
manipulation checks. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. Procedural anger was assessed 
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by asking participants to indicate to what extent they felt angry, furious, enraged, venomous, 
wound-up, infuriated, and boiling with anger about the way they were treated in the 
experiment (1 = not at all, 7 = completely; α = .88). Procedural sadness was assessed by 
asking participants to indicate to what extent they felt sad, somber, glum, doleful, mournful, 
and sorrowful about the way they were treated in the experiment (1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely; α = .88). 
The mindset manipulation was checked in the same two ways as in Experiment 1. 
First, participants were asked at the end of the experiment to rate on a 7-point scale how 
rationalistic versus experiential their reactions were (α = .86). Second, blind coders rated how 
experiential participants’ answers to the first and second open-ended question (both α’s = 
.96), as well as how rationalistic participants’ answers to the first (α = .95) and second open-
ended question (α = .96) were. Similar to Experiment 1, the fairness of the procedure 
manipulation was checked on a 7-point scale (α = .96). Finally, participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid for their participation.  
Results 
In all analyses, we regressed the manipulation checks and dependent variables on the 
centered AIM, and effect-coded mindset and procedure, testing for all main effects and all 
interactions.  
Manipulation checks. First, participants rated their reactions on a scale ranging from 
rationalistic to experiential, as more experiential in the experiential mindset condition (M = 
5.05, SD = 0.85), than in the rationalistic mindset condition (M = 3.12, SD = 1.05), β = -.72, 
t(110) = -11.12, p < .001.  
Second, blind coders rated participants’ reactions to the first open-ended question as 
more experiential for participants in experiential mindset conditions (M = 5.44, SD = 1.17) 
than for participants in rationalistic mindset conditions (M = 2.74, SD = 1.09), β = -.76, t(110) 
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= -12.94, p < .001). For the second question the same effect was found (β = -.75, t(110) = -
12.69, p < .001; MExperiential = 5.65, SD = 1.15; MRationalistic = 2.79, SD = 1.33), as well as a main 
effect of AIM, β = -.13, t(110) = -2.13, p =.04, but this effect was not qualified by an 
interaction of mindset with AIM. The coders also rated participants’ reactions to the first 
question as more rationalistic for participants in rationalistic mindset conditions (M = 5.17, SD 
= 1.30) than for participants in experiential mindset conditions (M = 2.89, SD = 1.29), β = .66, 
t(110) = 9.53, p < .001. The same effect was found for the second open question (β = .62, 
t(110) = 8.75, p < .001; MRationalistic = 4.57, SD = 1.75; MExperiential = 2.14, SD = 1.25). It is 
important to note that the effects of mindset were not qualified by an interaction with either 
procedure or affect intensity. The manipulation check findings suggest that the mindset 
manipulation was induced as intended. 
 Finally, being given the opportunity to voice their opinion was experienced by 
participants to be more fair (M = 5.55, SD = 1.09) than not being given the opportunity to 
voice their opinion (M = 3.69, SD = 1.28) , β = .62, t(110) = 8.30, p < .001.  
Procedural anger. Regressing the procedural anger scale yielded a significant main 
effect of procedure, β = -.18, t(110) = -2.05, p = .04, and a two-way interaction of mindset and 
procedure, β = .21, t(110) = 2.32, p = .02. More importantly, these effects were qualified by 
the predicted three-way interaction, β = .25, t(110) = 2.74, p < .01 (see Figure 2 for the visual 
presentation of the regression model). To get better insight into these effects, we subsequently 
conducted regression analyses with AIM and procedure as predictors in both the experiential 
and rationalistic mindset conditions. In the experiential mindset condition this yielded a main 
effect of procedure, β = -.37, t(56) = -3.15, p < .01, indicating that participants reacted angrier 
toward not being given the opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 1.98, SD = 1.07) compared 
to being given that opportunity (M = 1.32, SD = 0.55). Moreover, as expected, we found a 
significant two-way interaction between AIM and procedure, β = -.30, t(56) = -2.42, p = .02, 
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indicating that in the experiential condition participants’ anger reactions were moderated by 
affect intensity, such that the anger reactions increased with AIM in the no-voice condition, β 
= .37, t(27) = 2.08, p < .05, whereas no effects were found in the voice condition, β = -.14, 
t(29) = -0.73, p = .47. The left part of Figure 2 shows these effects. In the rationalistic 
mindset condition, we found no significant effects, as the right part of Figure 2 illustrates.  
Procedural sadness. Regressing the procedural sadness scale yielded a significant 
main effect of procedure, β = -.29, t(110) = -3.26, p < .01, and the three-way interaction, β = 
.21, t(110) = 2.27, p = .03 (see Figure 3 for the visual presentation of the regression model). 
To get a better insight into these effects, we subsequently conducted regression analyses with 
AIM and procedure as predictors in both the experiential and rationalistic mindset conditions. 
In the experiential condition this yielded a significant main effect of procedure, β = -.31, t(56) 
= -2.49, p = .02, indicating that in the experiential condition participants reacted more sad 
toward not being given the opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 2.34, SD = 1.13) compared 
to being given that opportunity (M = 1.73, SD = 0.92). Moreover, as expected, we found a 
significant two-way interaction between AIM and procedure, β = -.28, t(56) = -2.11, p = .04, 
indicating that participants’ sadness reactions were moderated by affect intensity, such that 
the sadness reactions tended to increase with AIM in the no-voice condition, β = .30, t(27) = 
1.65, p = .11, whereas no such effects were found in the voice condition, β = -.22, t(29) = -
1.22, p = .23. The left part of Figure 3 shows these effects. In the rationalistic mindset 
condition, we only found a significant main effect of procedure, β = -.28, t(54) = -2.12, p = 
.04, indicating that participants with a rationalistic mindset experienced more sadness in the 
no-voice condition (M = 2.20, SD = 0.97) compared to the voice condition (M = 1.76, SD = 
0.65). The right part of Figure 3 shows this effect. 
Discussion 
In accordance with our line of reasoning, and in correspondence with the results of 
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Experiment 1, the findings of Experiment 2 show that especially experiential mindsets make 
peoples’ experience of fair and unfair events susceptible to affect intensity. When participants 
had adopted a rationalistic mindset these individual differences in affect intensity had no 
statistically significant effects on their fairness reactions. That is, these participants overall 
only showed more negative reactions to unfair as compared to fair procedures, irrespective of 
affect intensity.  
General Discussion 
In both our experiments we induced either experiential or rationalistic mindsets in 
people and the experiments showed that people are able to react either more based on their gut 
feelings when in experiential states and more considered when in rationalistic states. 
Moreover, we found for both distributive and procedural fairness, two important fairness 
concepts in the fairness literature, evidence for our proposition that if experiential mindsets 
influence people’s fairness judgments through affect, then this influence will be further 
moderated by individual differences in affect intensity, while this will not be the case when 
people are using rationalistic mindsets.  
These are important findings, in part because they can cast some light on age-old 
discussions about whether people’s reactions to events are based on rationalistic reasoning 
processes or that affect and intuition play an important role and guide people’s reactions to 
fair and unfair events (see, e.g., Beauchamp, 2001; Cohen, 1986; Haidt, 2001, 2003; Haidt et 
al., 1993; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). By integrating insights from cognitive-experiential self-
theory (e.g., Epstein, 1985, 1994) and work on individual differences in affect intensity (e.g., 
Larsen et al., 1986; Van den Bos et al., 2003) our work shows that both experiential and 
rationalistic ways of processing information may influence people’s fairness reactions. That 
is, particularly experiential mindsets make experienced fairness susceptible to individual 
differences in affect intensity thereby causing more differentiated reactions to fair and unfair 
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events. Our findings further suggest that rationalistic mindsets yield more norm-based fairness 
reactions, such that participants reported to experience more negative affect after unfair 
outcomes and procedures than after fair ones, irrespective of affect intensity. This interesting 
pattern of results, found in both experiments reported here, supports theoretical claims made 
about the role individual differences in affect intensity may play in experiential and 
rationalistic modes of processing justice related information.  
Although this is a first line of studies, and although more research is needed to 
examine the robustness of the pioneering findings reported here, we do hope that one 
implication of our studies may be that they encourage researchers in the fairness literature to 
be more explicit about their assumptions of fairness reactions being driven by experiential or 
rationalistic processes. 
One of the effects that might need to be studied further, is the effect that rationalistic 
mindsets seem to neutralize the moderating effect of affect intensity. An explanation for this 
effect might be found in the cognitive operations associated with individual differences in 
affect intensity (Larsen, Billings, & Cutler, 1996; Larsen et al., 1978). Individuals who are 
emotional more intense are found to have a natural tendency to interpret events more in a self 
referential manner compared to individuals who are emotional less intense. This tendency 
might be reflected in our findings, such that individuals with high affect intensity care more 
about the fair and unfair events in a self-referential way, thereby reacting with more (versus 
less) negative affect after unfair (versus fair) events. Rationalistic mindsets may interfere with 
this natural tendency to interpret events more in a self referential manner, such that the 
moderating effect of affect intensity is neutralized in this condition. An alternative 
explanation for the effect that rationalistic mindsets seem to neutralize the moderating effect 
of affect intensity on people’s fairness reactions might be found in the literature in which it is 
argued that affective based judgment processes can be disrupted by analytic or more 
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deliberate thoughts (e.g., Halberstadt & Hooton, 2008; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). 
Whether either one of these two explanations might give more insight in the reported effects 
of rationalistic mindsets on people’s fairness reactions, would be a very interesting question 
for further research. 
In order to test our line of reasoning, we introduced a novel manipulation of 
experiential and rationalistic mindsets to the research literature, in which we induced the 
mindsets in participants by having them answer two open-ended questions of a story they had 
just read. As our manipulation checks showed, people indeed reacted more based on their gut 
feelings when experiential mindsets were induced and more deliberatively when rationalistic 
mindsets were induced. One could suggest that the effects on fairness reactions found in the 
experiments are caused by demand characteristics. Although participants were instructed to 
adopt either an experiential or a rationalistic mindset and to react accordingly to the story 
about Vera and Mark, it was highly unlikely that they would think the same instructions 
would count for the questions pertaining our measurement of their affective reactions to 
experienced fairness. First, within each experiment all parts in which the predictors were 
measured (affect intensity) or manipulated (mindset and outcome or procedure) were clearly 
presented as different studies, and none of the participants mentioned to have any suspicion 
about these three studies being related. Second, participants were not instructed to react either 
experientially or rationalistic to any information given during the fairness manipulations nor 
when reacting to these manipulations. Hence, we think it is reasonable to conclude, given the 
design and the reported results, that we developed a mindset manipulation in which the effects 
of this manipulation carried over to the tasks in which participants’ reactions to fair and unfair 
events were measured, without participants being aware of this carry-over effect.  
Furthermore, the results showed that especially people’s negative affective reactions to 
fair and unfair events are susceptible to the combination of experiential mindsets and 
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individual differences in affect intensity as we mooted here. As pointed out in Footnote 3, 
coders blind to the conditions and aim of the experiments rated the content of participants’ 
typed in answers as neither negative nor positive. Although we put forward in this first line of 
studies that this implies that these effects are not due to the fact that the story about Vera and 
Mark had a general negative effect on participants, we also would like to state that it would be 
interesting to further test our line of reasoning with different manipulations of both 
experiential and rationalistic mindsets.  
Besides from theoretical implications, these findings might also have implications for 
everyday life. According to cognitive-experiential self-theory, people construct a personal 
theory of reality and a major function of this personal theory may be to make life as 
satisfactory as possible under the conditions perceived as by the individual. These personal 
theories thereby assimilate reality and direct behavior, and, more importantly for the current 
purposes, this can be done in experiential or rationalistic ways (see e.g., Epstein et al., 1992). 
We have shown that people indeed may react differently to their perceived reality of fair and 
unfair events, depending on the mindset they find themselves in at that given moment. That is, 
participants perceived equal outcomes and fair procedures as fairer than unequal outcomes 
and unfair procedures, but their affective fairness reactions differentiated depending on their 
mindsets. Based on other lines of research (see e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; 
Weiss et al., 1999) arguing that different affects cause different behaviors, this may indicate 
that people will behave differently following similar fair and unfair events due to their 
mindsets. Of course these are assumptions that need to be tested in further research.  
We tested our line of reasoning for both outcome allocations and voice procedures, 
two important lines of research within the fairness literature. It would be interesting to extend 
this and implement our line of reasoning on other forms of fairness and fairness-related issues. 
One of these issues being people’s reactions when their believe in a just world in which one 
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gets what s/he deserves is threatened (e.g., Hafer & Begue, 2005; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). 
It would be interesting for example to test whether people, when confronted with an innocent 
victim, blame these victims to a greater or lesser extent depending on the mindset they are in 
when confronted with that victim. This would also be a good opportunity to measure behavior 
in order to be able to test whether mindsets indeed instigate different behaviors. 
Conclusions 
In the present paper we focused on the issue of what psychological processes are 
driving people’s reactions to fair and unfair events. Hereby we integrated in our work the 
assumption made in cognitive-experiential self-theory that the operation of experiential 
mindsets is intimately associated with affect-related experiences. We found that people in 
experiential mindsets--compared to rationalistic ones--are strongly influenced by individual 
differences in affect intensity and that indeed especially in experiential mindsets the effects of 
fair and unfair events are further moderated by individual differences in affect intensity. This 
suggests that it is important to pay appropriate attention to people’s states of mind and level of 
individual differences in affect intensity when addressing fairness reactions. 
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Footnotes 
1Because fairness research shows that experienced fair and unfair events more often 
elicits effects on negative affective reactions than on positive reactions (see, e.g., Mikula, 
Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Van den Bos et al., 2005), we only assessed participants’ 
negative affective reactions to the outcome distributions and procedures of Experiments 1 and 
2. 
2Please note that we also found that participants in the experiential mindset condition 
indicated to have reacted significantly more experientially than neutral (that is, they scored 
significantly above the midpoint of the 7-point scale), t(86) = 11.26, p < .001, and participants 
in the rationalistic mindset condition indicated to have reacted significantly more rationalistic 
than neutral (thus their scores were significantly below the midpoint of the 7-point scale), 
t(89) = -6.27, p < .001. Similar effects were found in Experiment 2. 
3 Blind coders also rated on a 7-point scale to what extent they thought the content of 
the answers typed in by participants was positive or negative (1 = very negative, 4 = neither 
negative nor positive, 7 = very positive). On average the coders rated participants’ answers 
around the scale mean (Mfirst question = 3.76, SD = 1.19 and Msecond question = 3.77, SD = 0.84), 
meaning that, according to the coders, the answers given by participants were neither very 
negative nor positive. Even though participants’ reactions seem to be very neutral, we 
correlated the coders’ ratings with our dependent variable (negative outcome affect) in order 
to rule out that the effects on our dependent variable were caused by possible variations in the 
feelings generated by the Vera and Mark scenario. As these correlations were not significant 
(rfirst question = -.07, p = .34 and rsecond question = -.06, p = .46) these checks suggest that the effects 
found on negative outcome affect are not due to a general negative feeling caused by the 
contents of the story about Vera and Mark. Similar effects were found in Experiment 2. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Affective-Experiential Mindsets and Fairness Reactions   31 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Strength of negative outcome affect as a function of affect intensity (one SD above 
and below the mean), mindset, and outcome (Experiment 1) 
Figure 2. Strength of procedural anger as a function of affect intensity (one SD above and 
below the mean), mindset and procedure (Experiment 2). 
Figure 3. Strength of procedural sadness as a function of affect intensity (one SD above and 
below the mean), mindset and procedure (Experiment 2).  
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